Wednesday, January 28, 2009

Taiwan Strait ties enter tough political test







It took civilian airplanes from China and Taiwan almost 60 years to fly directly to each other`s airports. They had been separated by a narrow strip of water called the Taiwan Strait since Chiang Kai-shek`s Kuomintang (KMT) government lost a civil war to Mao Zedong`s Communist troops in 1949. Since that time, Beijing and Taipei had been locked in a series of disputes, chief among them over sovereignty right of which side represents China.

Last year marked a turning point in the relations between Taiwan and China following the election of KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou as president of the Republic of China in Taiwan. Not long after Ma`s election victory in March 2008, a major breakthrough in cross-Taiwan Strait relations came when top negotiators from both sides signed agreements on direct air and shipping links, postal services and food safety. What caused the breakthrough? And what are the prospects of the often rocky relationships between the two ideological rivals?

To the first question, a simple answer is that the political and economic situations on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have changed a lot and events on each side have been in intense interaction. Leaders in both capitals found it in their own interest to show pragmatism and flexibility.

In Taiwan, the KMT, which lost power in 2000, has been moving away from former President Lee Teng-hui`s pro-independence stance characterized by his "special state-to-state relations" proposition. Instead, the KMT has made efforts to return to its original position based on what it termed as "the 1992 consensus" - a consensus between top negotiators from Beijing and Taipei in 1992 that there was only one China on earth but both China and Taiwan were free to interpret what "one China" meant. In 2005, KMT Chairman Lien Chan embarked on a historic "tour of peace" of China, reaching agreements with his host on quite a number of issues. Ma Ying-jeou, who succeeded Lien as KMT chairman, continued Lien`s peace-oriented China policy and went on to win the 2008 presidential election, reducing China`s suspicion that Taiwan might seek independence and creating a good environment for improved cross-Strait ties.

At the same time, Taiwan`s slowing economy had driven an increasing number of business people to invest abroad, mostly in China, whose rapid economic growth marked a striking contrast with that of Taiwan. Taiwan`s economic strength has been further overshadowed by China which seemed to have enjoyed the benefits of increasing globalization and regionalization. Under such circumstances, Taiwan had to rethink its economic ties with China. Ma`s election win not only removed many factors of tension across the Strait but also created a new environment in which Taiwan would be able to seek economic growth. This was why agreements on direct air and shipping links as well as postal services could be signed so soon after his inauguration in May 2008.

In China, leaders were quick to seize what they called a "once-in-a-blue-moon opportunity in history" by resuming negotiations with a Taiwan led by a president who was willing to accept the so-called "one China" principle, albeit in the context of the KMT`s "1992 consensus." Cross-Strait talks broke off as China insisted that "one China" was a precondition for talks with Taiwan, whose "special state-to-state ties" theory made Beijing nervous. The Democratic Progressive Party`s eight years in power (2000-2008) only worsened bilateral ties. Beijing was much relieved after the KMT regained the authority to govern Taiwan in 2008.

In the meantime, China has learned to be patient in dealing with Taiwan. When resuming talks with Taiwan, China adopted the principles of "building mutual trust, maximizing consensus, putting controversies on the backburner, and creating a win-win situation." Seeking to institutionalize cross-Strait talks, Beijing has emphasized the need for "negotiations on equal footing, communications based on good will, accumulation of consensuses, and actions taken actively and pragmatically." In Beijing`s view, cross-Strait relations should now be pursued in a gradual and orderly manner on the principle of "economics over politics, and easy tasks ahead of difficult ones." Apparently, Beijing thought that setting an orderly and effective agenda for cross-Strait talks would be conducive to producing good results, building mutual confidence, and eventually achieving a peaceful development of cross-Strait ties.

China`s growing economic and national power has boosted its confidence in dealing with the complicated issues in cross-Strait relations. In a year-end speech aimed at "Taiwan compatriots" in 2008, China`s top leader Hu Jintao pointed out that China`s open-door and reform policy as well as its modernization programs have built a solid framework for developing cross-Strait relations, an indication that China was now more confident than ever in managing the often rocky relations.

As a result, Beijing has been able to demonstrate greater flexibility when negotiating with Taipei over such topics as direct air and shipping transportation and postal services. It could now refrain from getting bogged down by sensitive and controversial political issues, managing to move on to reach agreements with Taipei over the proposals that it had actually put forward 30 years ago.

The ups and downs of cross-Taiwan Strait relations in 2008 are a good indicator of where they are going in 2009. It is expected that both sides will hold serious discussions about such economic issues as financial cooperation, mechanisms of financial supervision and currency clearance, investment protection accord, avoidance of double taxation, protection of intellectual property rights and joint efforts to crack down on crime. It is likely that both sides will seal deals on even more wide-ranging economic cooperation projects.

Beijing is prepared not only to continue talks over economic matters. It is also ready to sound out Taipei`s response to its ideas about the mid- and long-term prospects of cross-Strait relations that will inevitably involve negotiations over political differences. Hu`s six-point proposal on that issue covers comprehensive economic cooperation pacts, joint forums on foreign affairs, building mutual confidence in the military area and signing a peace agreement.

Looking ahead, the positive trends mentioned above will likely continue in the near future. Regional peace will be a dividend from improved Taiwan-China relations. However, deeply ingrained mistrust and contradictions between the two are not likely to disappear soon.

For example, the people in Taiwan will be watching closely whether their representatives will be allowed to attend the World Health Assembly as observers in Geneva in May 2009. If so, it will mark a milestone in alleviating political tension across the Taiwan Strait, as an observer status in the world forum will go a long way to helping relieve Taiwanese anger at Beijing`s high-handed efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally, something it has been doing for decades.

Even with that sort of positive development, it is premature to predict that all will go well with cross-Strait relations.

For instance, from the economic perspective, whether Taiwan will benefit from improved cross-Strait ties depends on how profitable the business community will be after they move their investments from China back to Taiwan. This involves not just cross-Strait economic cooperation pacts, which includes those of avoiding double taxation and currency clearance, but also Taiwan`s own investment environment, which is related to such complex factors as government ability to improve the environment and administrative efficiency.

Furthermore, even though Taiwan and China have signed a deal on direct shipping links, controversy still arose in Taiwan. Lin Chuo-shui, a former legislator of the opposition DPP, said only Taiwan-registered vessels are permitted to run the routes while strict limits are still clamped down on flag-of-convenience vessels - the foreign-registered ships owned by Taiwanese. This means what the Taiwan government calls "special shipping routes" will become "domestic shipping routes," putting Taiwan in a great disadvantage in terms of international competitiveness, Lin noted.

There will be even higher hurdles in the political area. One reason is that all along the way, Beijing has insisted on its one-China principle as it has been adept at manipulating this issue at home and abroad. Beijing`s manipulation goes like this: In dealing with Taiwan, it would claim that both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China; in the international arena, it is adamant in its insistence that the People`s Republic of China is the sole legitimate government of China and, thus, the Republic of China in Taiwan must be excluded from any international institutions whose memberships are accorded only to legitimate governments.

Beijing has made it a point not only to suppress Taiwan in its efforts to join international organizations that accept legitimate governments as members. It has gone on to strike at Taiwan in such amateur sports organizations as the International Olympic Committee by blocking Taiwan from using its official title, flag and anthem. It is easily imaginable how frustrated Taiwanese are by such an unfair and humiliating treatment.

Hu Jintao`s latest proposal regarding Taiwan`s participation in international organizations is not helpful at all in giving the people of Taiwan a reason for optimism. He said that China would give it a thought only when Taiwan`s proposal does not create an impression of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." Such remarks simply nip in the bud suggestions put forward by quite a number of Taiwanese academics that both dies consider the possibility of establishing a federal umbrella in regard to a future political arrangement of Taiwan-China relations.

Professor Tung Li-wen of National Police University said Hu`s six-point proposal on the future of Taiwan-China relations has restrained development of cross-Strait relations, particularly in regard to Taiwan`s participation in international activities. Hu`s proposal is a negative response to Ma Ying-jeou`s suggestion that both sides not "nullify" each other. Hu has also turned down the KMT`s call for him to "face reality," Tung said.

Down the road, Taiwan is not likely to accept China`s constant attempts to make it look like a local government of the PRC. This sort of sensitive political problem will have to be solved sooner or later.

As a matter of fact, national identity and China policy have always been a knotty issue in Taiwan, as its two major political parties - the KMT and the DPP - have never been able to reach a consensus over the emotionally-charged issue. Democratic elections and changes of government serve merely as opportunities for politicians to fan up emotions and magnify the issue even more seriously - and fiercely. If the KMT loses a national election again - and election wins and losses are normal in any democracy - no one can be sure that separatism will not rise again. By that time, one can safely expect that cross-Strait relations will become turbulent.

For now, the Gordon knot is not a threat to cross-Strait relations as both sides are happy to concentrate on economic matters. Once political issues come up, impacts can be expected not only on cross-Strait ties but also on regional peace and stability. As Director Chang Wu-yueh of the Graduate Institute of China Studies of Tamkang University in Taipei pointed out, the upcoming the WHA meeting is the critical test in the development of relations between Taiwan and China. If Taiwan`s bid at observer status gets spurned again, setback is not unlikely in cross-Strait ties, he added.

Since the 1980s, relations between Taiwan and China have been rocky. In contrast to the ups and downs of their political ties, civilian exchanges have become increasingly close and frequent. According to statistics compiled by Taiwan`s Mainland Affairs Council, Taiwanese made 4.7 million visits to China whereas Chinese made 320,000 visits to Taiwan in 2007. During the same year, Taiwan exported $62.4 billion in goods to China while importing $28 billion worth of products from China, enjoying a trade surplus of $34.4 billion. China has become the top source of Taiwan`s trade surplus.

Meanwhile, unofficial figures show that Taiwanese business people have invested $150-300 billion in China, more than 1 million Taiwanese are currently living in China, and cross-Strait marriages number over 300,000, with some 250,000 mainland Chinese brides (as Taiwanese are used to calling them) living in Taiwan. Educational exchanges are increasing fast and wide, with Taiwan considering recognition of degrees issued by China`s educational institutions. All this shows that Taiwan-China relations are getting more and more complicated, evolving and developing at various levels, in many areas.

In sum, 2008 saw a "surge in peace" in the development of cross-Taiwan Strait relations following the presidential election in March, a development which was welcomed by the international community. There are still possibilities of glitches and even conflicts. How to maximize their consensuses on peace and prosperity while minimizing the possibilities of conflicts in order eventually to normalize bilateral ties and to create a win-win situation for all is an ultimate test that history has prepared for leaders in Taipei and Beijing. If they cannot achieve that high aim, at least they can leave it to the coming generations.

By Huang Chi-kuan






[출처 : 코리아헤럴드]

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