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| North Korean leader Kim Jong-il inspects the newly built Red Flag Sojung secondary school in Rakwon County in South Hamgyeong Province. This undated picture was released from North Korea’s official Korean Central News Agency, Thursday. / AFP-Yonhap |
By Andrei Lankov
Korea Times Columnist
North Korea attracts much attention these days. On April 5, North Korea launched what it called a satellite. Many people would probably describe it as a long-range ballistic missile, but this is largely an academic discussion: difference between a ballistic missile and a rocket is rather minor, since the technology is, essentially, the same.
The launch failed, but North Korean media did not admit it. The North Korean populace was told that the satellite is orbiting the earth and broadcasting songs about Kim Jong-il. Well, what else would you expect North Korean media to claim?
Everything which followed the launch was predictable. The UN Security Council issued another letter which informed Kim Jong-il about the great unease his reckless action produced outside his country's borders as if he was not aware of this actually. As we'll see, such unease was the major goal of the entire exercise.
The low-key but determined resistance of China and Russia nearly precluded the possibility of any tightening of the sanctions' regime, so the UN limited itself to blacklisting few North Korean firms.
This was, essentially, a token reaction. Nonetheless, North Korean diplomats claimed that the evil imperialists deprive their country of its natural right to explore outer space.
Official North Korean daily even said that Pyongyang has to protect the most cherished dream of North Korean children who, according to the newspaper, want to become space pilots.
The North Korean officials say that they have no choice: facing such a hostile reaction to heir peaceful scientific activities, they must protect ourselves and therefore will intensify their nuclear program. Recently, North Korea reactivated its nuclear plant and began preparations for removal of the fuel rods, an essential source of raw material for extracting plutonium.
All these events produced headlines in newspapers worldwide. But for a long-term observer of the North Korean politics, all this is almost boring. We have seen such things many times.
When North Korean leaders need something from the outside world, they always use the same trick. The first step is to create a crisis and raise tensions. Second step is to get payments and concessions for solving the crisis usually, but not necessarily, by returning to the status quo. This is, essentially, a large-scale blackmail. It seems primitive, but it usually works.
So, why did they raise all this hell now, and what do they want? Both questions have rather simple answers. They chose to provoke a crisis now, because they know that the White House has a new tenant.
There are good reasons to believe that in his dealing with the North President Obama will continue the policy President Bush launched in early 2007: that is, the policy of negotiation and compromise.
However, the North Koreans believe that a timely crisis would make Obama and his people ready to give even more. Pyongyang leaders also worry that their country is sliding down in the US priorities' list. Indeed, the economic crisis and Pakistan are serious distractions. However, Pyongyang diplomats know: in order to negotiate efficiently, they should be perceived as a major headache.
The recent launch which was a political exercise, pure and simple, its military, let alone scientific significance is negligible. Needless to say, one of the world's poorest nations has no reason to waste huge sums of money on satellite program.
The military significance of the launch is somewhat doubtful as well. Military experts believe that North Korean still has a long way to go before it will finally develop efficient long-range missiles. The missiles they have now are not reliable and require few days to be prepared for launch and, on top of that, North Korean engineers have not developed nuclear warheads for these crude missiles.
But all this is not really important. The missile was essentially a signal sent to Washington. It was Pyognayng's way of saying: ``Mr. President, we are here, we are very dangerous and completely unpredictable. So, talk to us, and do not forget about sending your next paycheck just in time!''
If we have a more careful look at the recent North Korean statements, we can find more hints at what they want now. The Foreign Ministry statement contained curious references to the light water reactors.
In 1994 North Korea was promised such reactors (expensive, good for producing energy but useless for the military programs) as a reward for its willingness to abandon nuclear weapons program. The construction of the light water reactors began, but it came to a halt after a crisis of 2002 when North Korea was accused of secretly producing highly enriched uranium.
Recently, Pyongyang stated that now it will build those reactors themselves. This is not very plausible, since North Korea has neither money nor technology for such a sophisticated project.
This rather seems to be a hint for Washington. ``We are ready to talk if the U.S. government agrees to revive the 1994 agreement, and will resume the construction of the light water reactors''.
Of course, one has to be naive to expect that this will be the only condition. More demands will surface later. Nonetheless, the revival of the light water reactors project seems to be their major demand on this stage.
They do not need it right now. Their economic situation has improved slightly, so for the time being North Korea is not in dire need of aid. Therefore, they can afford to think long-term.
The statement also hinted at the measures the North Koreans will use if the expected concessions will not be agreed upon soon enough.
The recent statement about the need to boost the nuclear deterrent might mean that the North Korea is considering another nuclear test. Strictly speaking, they need it from the purely technical viewpoint.
In October 2006 their nuclear device did not work well enough, so another test is necessary. They are not in a hurry, but if no major concessions will be made in the near future, another test might be conducted. This was confirmed again when they said that a nuclear test would take place unless U.N. Security Council express its apology for being rude towards North Korea.
If the nuclear test does not help, they will invent something else, to be sure. Pyongyang leaders do not know how to run a modern economy, but they know where vulnerabilities of the major opponents are.
Perhaps, a real or imitated proliferation case will be their next step. They might provide some nasty state in the Middle East (or elsewhere) with dangerous technology, or they might pretend that they are doing this, by arranging leaks and circulating rumors. They know that proliferation is the major worry of the U.S., and they will exploit this weak spot with the greatest efficiency.
So, we have to be ready for a tough ride. But what is the most advisable reaction to this blackmail? My humble self is not going to give unsolicited advice to the leaders of the world's sole remaining superpower, but it seems that the 'benevolent neglect', much talked about these days, is not really an option.
Pyongyang will keep raising the stakes until the risks will finally become unacceptable. After all, Pyongyang knows that not much can be done. Military operation is not even an option, and thorough sanctions, if successful (a big ``if'') is likely to bring many more famine deaths but no revolution. Therefore, negotiations seem to be the only option.
However, Washington needs not to be in hurry. George W. Bush made a serious mistake when in February 2007 he restarted negotiations immediately after the nuclear test.
He essentially admitted to the North Koreans that blackmail not merely works, but makes wonders. The U.S. refused to talk for years, but suddenly switched to softer line just after a half-baked nuclear explosion in the North Korean mountains. Frankly, such a switch was a probably good idea, but its timing was clearly bad.
Therefore, it is essential to keep cool with full understanding that North Korean leaders will move from one provocation to another.
Talks should be continued, but every provocative step from the North should halt negotiations for a while, not hasten things up. Will the U.S. government, hard pressed by domestic politics, economy and Middle East, be able to handle North Korea with sufficient reserve?
Nobody knows, albeit the first signs seemingly give reasons for hope. Americans did not make a scene, but they did not rush to negotiate either. It's good: the 'North Korean problem' is here to stay at least as long as Kim Jong-il and his family stays in control in Pyongyang.
anlankov@yahoo.com
[출처 : 코리아타임스]
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